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鉴于此，本文以中组部的 18 号文作为外生事件，通过手工搜集 2013 年 10 月 19









































Politically Connected Independent Directors:
Grabbing Hand or Helping Hand?
[Abstract] The independent directors of China are always an embarrassed and special
group with much question and attention. They were born in praise and lived in doubts. They
wear ‘independent’ and ‘professional’ aura, but they are also dubbed a hat of ‘The Vase’ and
‘A Rubber Stamp’, and faced with many doubts such as ‘not clean’, ‘not diligent’, ‘not
independent’ and ‘not professional’. From 10/19/2013 when the Organization Department of
the Central Committee of the CPC released <Comments on further standardizing the
problem of cadres working in the enterprises part time or full time> which was commonly
called ‘18th File’, the resignation tide of politically connected independent directors then
pushed the phenomenon of ‘revolving door between government and business’ (i.e. the
phenomenon of retired or incumbent officials working in the listed companies as an
independent director), which has become a hot topic in society under strong anti-corruption
of central government, to the media spotlight. So what roles do politically connected
independent directors play in the listed companies: a ‘Grabbing Hand’ or a ‘Helping Hand’?
Given all this, using the 18th File as an exogenous event and a hand-collected data set of
790 resignation announcement events of independent directors happening in Chinese A-share
listed companies from 10/19/2013 to 12/31/2014, this paper tests the market reaction (i.e.
cumulative abnormal return) of the resignation of politically connected independent directors
through event study in order to investigate the practical value of these people, and to discuss
that the political connection of independent directors on earth is a ‘Grabbing Hand’ or a
‘Helping Hand’ for listed companies. After controlling the nature of property right and other
related factors, we find that investors significantly and positively react to the resignation of
politically connected independent directors, and the positive market reaction of politically
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connected independent directors is significantly stronger than non-politically connected
independent directors’. This result indicates that the politically connected independent
director is more like a grabbing hand, and ultimately dwindles the value of company. Based
on this, we further analyze the heterogeneity of market reaction of politically connected
independent directors’ resignation from the perspective of individual, company and macro
environment. Results show that bank credit resources, regulation strength and external
institutional environment significantly affects politically connected independent directors’
practical value, but individual political level, professionalism, educational background,
tenure and government grants received have no influence on the value of politically
connected independent directors.
Overall, our findings enrich and expand the research content and direction of the
independent director system and political connection, at the same time what we find is
helpful for understanding and recognizing the governance behavior of independent directors
and effectiveness of independent director system more scientifically and objectively, and
provides important implications for improving the design of the independent director system
in China and establishing a new political-business relations.
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第 1 章 绪论
1
第 1 章 绪论
1.1 研究背景
1.1.1 现实背景









从 2013 年 10 月 19 日至 2014 年 12 月 31 日，沪深两市共有 963 人主动请辞独立董事






人兼任多家上市公司独董的情况，总共 1,101人，平均每 2.3家上市公司就有 1人次官
员独董①。不同的是，独立董事作为个人主业之外的一种兼职形式，更加受到广大退休
高官的“追捧”。据统计，2013 年市值排名前 50 的上市公司中，有 34 位政府退休高官
出任独立董事②，而“中字头”央企的独董一职则几乎被前任高级官员“包场”。位高
权重的官员摇身一变成为独立董事，俨然成了全球资本市场上一道别样风景，这种“中
① 资料来源：《凤凰财经》2014年 8 月 6 日刊登的《前 7 个月 每天至少有一名独董辞职》一文，网页链接：
http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20140806/12867016_0.shtml。
























































Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and 
Dissertations Database”.  
Fulltexts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on 
http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit requests online, or consult the interlibrary 
loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn 
for delivery details. 
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
